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NOTES
THE LAW OF OBSCENITY: NEW SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
RECEIVING GROUP
After a long history of change' the law of obscenity has presently
culminated in the case Roth v. United States,' where it was held that ob-
scene publications are not within the protection of the first and fourteenth
amendments. Certain standards for obscenity which had evolved were
reiterated, namely, that printed matter is obscene which taken as a whole
appeals to the prurient interests of the average person of the community.
A state statute previously had been declared unconstitutional which pro-
hibited the distribution of materials to the general public if they were
obscene only as to children.' In a subsequent case, United States v. 31
Photos,4 a district court found it necessary to qualify the Roth test inso-
far as it measured the effect of materials on the average man. This case
held that under the Tariff Act5 the effect of the materials on the average
reader or recipient, rather than on the average man in the community,
was material. The recipient was the Institute for Sex Research at Indi-
1. The earliest cases did not involve obscenity as it is known today. The first re-
ported case, Le Ray v. Sr. Charles Sedley, 1. Sid. 168, pl. 29, 82 Eng. Rep. 1037 (K.B.
1663), involved what would now be the crime of indecent exposure. Alpert, Censorship
of Obscene Literature, 52 HARv. L. Rxv. 40, 41-43 (1938). The first case dealing solely
with obscene publication was Dominus Rex v. Curl, 2 Strange 489, 93 Eng. Rep. 849
(K.B. 1727), where the court overruled a prior case which had held that obscenity was
a crime against religion, and therefore not punishable at law. Alpert, supra at 43-44.
Thus, a crime at first contrary only to religious mores became a common law crime. A
later leading case, Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 98 Eng. Rep. 327 (K.B. 1770), was in-
spired by a desire for political revenge. Alpert, supra at 44-47. Even the landmark case
in the law of obscenity for a hundred years, Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868),
was not strictly an obscenity case. The evil sought to be punished in the indictment was
blasphemy, rather than obscenity, but the test used in that case fitted the censor's needs
adequately when the time came to find a test for obscenity. As a matter of fact, the
author's purpose in publishing the material in Regina v. Hicklin was to attack the church,
not to build up a business in obscenity. Alpert, supra at 52-53. Therefore, it may be
stated that the present law on obscenity entered through the back door-certainly the
harm in the earliest cases was not directly recognized.
In the 1930's the Hicklin test was modified by the Ulysses case, United States v. One
Book called Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934), which considered the book as a whole,
including its literary value. A later case added the qualification that the book was to
be judged by the standard of the community as a whole, and not by the most susceptible
member thereof. United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936).
2. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
3. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
4. 156 F.Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
5. 46 Stat. 688 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1952).
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ana University, founded by the late Dr. Alfred Kinsey. The court's as-
sumption that the materials, which were pure pornography, were obscene
as measured by the mores of the community as a whole was not chal-
lenged by either party.6 Furthermore, the government did not take issue
with the contention of the claimant that the materials would not appeal to
the prurient interests of the scientists who would observe them, but in-
stead relied on the theory found in certain prior cases that such materials
were obscene per se.' The court, rejecting this contention, stated that the
term obscene per se had a different meaning from that which the govern-
ment was seeking to apply8 and held the materials at bar not obscene
under the circumstances.
The court could have resolved the 31 Photos controversy by employ-
ing either one of two theories: it could have declared that the materials
were not obscene, or it could have held the materials obscene but admis-
sable on the theory of scientific privilege.9 Undoubtedly it always seems
more palatable to judges to say they are following the letter of a statute
rather than creating an exception based on some "spirit" of the statute.
Thus it would seem more feasable to allowpassage of materials by hold-
ing that they are not obscene, even though the privilege theory would
lead to the same result. This the court did, but observed that a choice
between theories was not required because the two were but opposite sides
of the same coin."
Regardless of which theory is adopted, it is apparent that the court
was dealing with two variables. The first is the degree by which the
materials, as measured by any fixed standard, are prurient or obscene;
the second is the bona fides of the receiving group. Each of the variables
in 31 Photos was extreme." First, the materials involved were pure
6. 156 F. Supp. 350, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
7. One of the most significant facts about this case was that the government did
not press its case as much as it might have, probably because of the public interest in-
volved. The disadvantage generally of placing a large degree of discretion with enforce-
ment officials is that it results in a lack of uniformity, and that the policy of the legis-
lature is at the mercy of many individuals-some of whom are bound to have extreme
views. This danger is illustrated in the law of obscenity by an instance in which the
magazine Scientific American was forced by threat of banishment from the mails to
refrain from picturing a female native of New Guinea nude above the waist on its cover.
Paul and Schwartz, Obscenity in the Mails: A Comment on Some Problems of Federal
Censorship, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 214, 225 (1957).
8. See note 20 infra and accompanying text.
9. An article written by one of the attorneys for the Institute indicated that she
would have preferred the privilege theory. Harriet F. Pilpel, "But Can You Do That?"
Publishers Weekly, Nov. 25, 1957, pp. 27-30.
10. 156 F. Supp. 350, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
11. One can only speculate at the results for the numerous degrees of variation in
between. After the cases are adjudicated the problem might become less acute, but one
can envisage a painful process in getting to that point.
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pornography with no literary value whatsoever; second, the good faith of
the receiving group was as nearly beyond question as possible because of
its association with the University, its past reputation for work in this
area, and the high degree of probability that society would receive tangible
benefits from the study of these materials.'
These variables although simply stated are difficult to measure and
therefore to apply. The first, relating to the degree of pruriency as
measured by the common conscience of the community taken as a whole,
has been treated extensively in the literature.' It is the second, relating
to the bona fides of the receiving group, which is relatively novel. This
variable raises the problems treated in this note.
EXISTING LAW ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RECEIVING GROUP
The Regina v. Hicklin test,' which was the leading one for so long,
measured the material challenged as obscene by "those whom it is likely
to reach." There was ample authority for the holding of 31 Photos, then,
in the language in prior cases.' 5 However, there are certain inconsis-
tencies with existing law which are worthy of note. For example, in the
Roth case the majority appears to be employing an obscene per se analysis
which is contrary to 31 Photos. Chief Justice Warren, concurring, re-
inforces this view by accusing the majority of putting the book itself on
trial, rather than the publisher or seller of the book.'" If the materials
were obscene per se, then the effect on the particular receiving group
would not be significant.
At this point it is necessary to define the term obscenity per se with
some particularity. A strict definition would be that a publication was
lewd, lascivious, and so forth in the trier of fact's mind, regardless of who
published it, how it was published, for what purpose, who will read it, and
what its effects will be. The term unlawful per se generally implies that
certain conduct is unlawful regardless of the actor's intent or whether
12. The court explicitly held, however, that probability of success of the research
was not a consideration for the courts. 156 F. Supp. 350, 359-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
13. E.g., Alpert, supra note 1; Lockhart and McClure, Literature, The Law of
Obscenity, and the Constittioi , 38 MINN. L. Rav. 295 (1954).
14. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868). See also note 1 supra.
15. For a collection of cases on which the court in 31 Photos relied see 128 F. Supp.
350, 354 n.15. The court attempted to distinguish two cases containing dicta to the con-
trary. Id. at 354 n.14, 355 n.20. The case distinguished in note 14, United States v. One
Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1934), stated as follows: "[I]t may
also be true that the applicability of the statute does not depend on the persons to whom
a publication is likely to be distributed. The importer of obscene books is prohibited
generally, and no provision is made permitting such importation because of the charac-
ter of those to whom they are sold." But see United States v. 1 Package, 86 F.2d 737
(2d Cir. 1936), where the court adopted the privilege theory.
16. 354 U.S. 476, 494 (1957) (concurring opinion).
any actual harm results in a particular instance." Per se intimates that
only conduct will be examined."
In practical application, however, obscene per se is by no means a
term of definite meaning."x It should be noted that there are several
factors relevant to the term obscenity. All the various intents of the
creator, distributors, and consumers as to conduct and harm are im-
portant, as is also actual harm. A strict definition of obscenity per se
would disregard all of these factors which relate to the harm sought to
be prevented or the conduct and intent sought to be penalized. A less
than strict definition would disregard any combination of factors (other
than all of them), depending on the type of proceeding and at what point
the attack is being made; that is, whether it is a criminal action against
the creator or distributors of the materials, an in rem action against the
materials themselves, or a criminal action against the buyer or consumer
of the materials. In a criminal attempt or a malum-prohibitum criminal
action against a creator or distributor actual harm would be disregarded.
In an in rem action against the materials themselves intent, actual harm,
or both2" may be disregarded. In a criminal action against a buyer or
consumer intent on the part of the creator or distributor would be dis-
regarded. For example, no one would contend that the intent of the
publisher was relevant in the 31 Photos case where the action was founded
on a forfeiture statute, yet it may well have been in the Roth case, where
a criminal statute was involved. Conversely, to whom the materials were
in fact destined was irrelevant in the Roth case,2 but relevant in the 31
Photos case. Courts should recognize that different statutes deal with
different elements of obscenity, and that a finding of obscenity in an
action under one type of statute may be irrelevant under another. The
17. Leibel v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 103 Mont. 370, 62 P.2d 667 (1936); Ells-
worth v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, 66 N.D. 578, 268 N.W. 400 (1936).
18. The reason for examining conduct only is that experience indicates that where
there is a certain type of conduct, there is a very high probability that there was an
intent to do harm, and that the harm will follow from the conduct. In other words,
rather than waste time in proof which ordinarily is predictable in outcome, the courts
will indulge in a conclusive presumption.
19. The court in 31 Photos noted two definitions which it stated had been mis-
interpreted by government's counsel. These were that materials are obscene per se
where there was not shown in the record to be any one to whom the materials would be
other than prurient, and where the effect of the materials are such on the relevant group
that they are obscene as a matter of law. 156 F. Supp. 350, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
20. This definition was the one which the government sought to apply in 31 Photos.
21. It should be noted that an element of the intent of a publisher or seller will
generally be to send the materials to a certain group, but another group may actually
be destined to receive the materials. Thus the creator, publisher or distributor of the
materials at issue in 31 Photos undoubtedly never intended for them to be sent to the




purpose of the obscenity laws should be to prevent a certain type of harm
or an intent or attempt to perpetrate this harm. Courts in construing
statutes whose purposes are not clearly stated may be misled by general
rules and principles. Thus, cases involving criminal statutes should be
examined critically before being accepted as precedent for cases based on
consumption statutes, and vice versa.
If the majority in Roth is merely saying that the intent of the pub-
lisher is immaterial, then 31 Photos does not appear to be inconsistent
with the Roth case, since the former did not look at the publisher's intent
either. Likewise, the Roth majority did not expressly dismiss the rele-
vance of the receiving group-the entire community in that instance.
Constitutional issues aside, if the postal statute and the customs statute
are interpreted as imposing restrictions malum-prohibitum, and not mala-
in-se, so that the intent of the publisher is immaterial, then the only rele-
vant factor may be the effect of the materials on the receiving group. If
this is the case, then Chief Justice Warren's objection to the Roth deci-
sion simply goes to the problem of whether a defendant should be con-
victed in a criminal proceeding without a mens rea.
Statutory provisions for the destruction of obscene materials would
imply that such materials might be obscene per se." The legislature evi-
dently thought that obscene materials were inherently harmful and that
there could be no possible utility in preserving the confiscated materials.23
This reasoning savors of the obscene per se theory and to that extent is
contrary to 31 Photos.
31 Photos, where the receiving group was found to be bona fide, at-
tempted to lay down a test for the bona fides of the group.24 It consisted
of two elements: first, the number of copies sought to be imported; and
second, whether the group was connected with a reputable scientific in-
stitution. Another case,2" holding the receiving group not bona fide,
22. 46 Stat. 688 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1952) ; N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 22-a,
para. 3.
23. It may be argued that these provisions are but additional criminal sanctions
in the form of penalties. The destruction or forfeiture of obscene materials would
probably not be a very heavy penalty, however, since there is little value in the picture
or printing itself. This conclusion is based on the assumption that additional copies may
be run off easily from other copies or the original plates. Therefore, these provisions
were probably not adopted as a penalty.
24. 156 F. Supp. 350, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
25. United States v. One Unbound Volume, 128 F. Supp. 280 (D. Md. 1955). The
multiple copy element would not seem to be useful to show good faith if after obtaining
a single copy, other copies may be reproduced from the original and disseminated. How-
ever, if many copies are imported, bad faith may be inferred. Conversely, the prior
publication point should not be relied on too heavily where there has been no prior
publication, since it discriminates against newcomers in the field, but it may be used
to prove good faith where there has been prior publications. Similarly, the point on
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added a third element, which was whether the group had published any
prior works on the subject. Although the latter case is inconsistent with
31 Photos in that the court did not make a finding as to the prurient ef-
fect on the claimant himself, the facts of both cases help to illustrate how
the test for bona fide scientific interest will be applied. The materials,
erotic prints from ancient vases, were sought to be imported for study
by an alleged archeologist. There was no holding as to their prurient
effect on the importer. The court held the material subject to forfeiture
under the Tariff Act as obscene on the ground that the importer was not
a bona fide scientist, in spite of the fact that he introduced his library in
evidence and testified that he had taken some courses in archeology while
in college. The importer was a microchemist by occupation. But the
court, emphasizing the fact that the claimant was not connected with any
learned society and that he had not published any works on the subject,26
termed him at most an amateur.
A case of similar value involved facts approximating, those in the
archeologist case.2 ' The opinion stated that the obscene books might
have a use in anthropology and psychotherapy, and that they could be sold
to laymen "who wished seriously to study the sexual practices of savage
or barbarous peoples."28  However, under the facts of the case where
distribution was to the general public, the court held the materials obscene.
SOME SPECIFIC PROBLEMS
The Standard within the Group
When materials are distributed to the general public they are measured
by their prurient effect on the average person of the community. If this
cross section of the community standard is not employed, the test is un-
constitutional.2" A question not answered in 31 Photos is whether this
same cross section standard must be used when the receiving group is less
than the entire community, or whether each individual must pass the
pruriency test. If the language of the opinion supports either theory, it
supports the latter." Under the facts of 31 Photos, however, the court
connection with a recognized institution should not be relied on heavily to prove bad
faith, but may be used to prove good faith.
26. Id. at 282.
27. United States v. Rebhuhn, 109 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 629
(1940).
28. Id. at 514.
29. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) ; Volanski v. United States, 246 F.2d
842 (6th Cir. 1947).
30. The court's finding was: "That as to those who will have access to the material
sought to be imported, there is no reasonable probability that it will appeal to their
prurient interest." 156 F. Supp. 350, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
INDIANA'.' LAW JOURATAL
was 'not required to make this finding. This problem is further illus-
trated'by a case31 where an allegedly educational film entitled "Mom and
Dad" was held obscene because shown to the general public. There was
a dictum that'the film would probably not be obscene32 if the audience
were restricted to doctors and nurses. Although the opinion did not in-
"dicate, the government censor was evidently relying on a statute prohibit-
ing the distribution of obscene materials.3" If in showing the film it
would be necessary for the projectionist to view it, it is very likely that
he as an individual would not meet the pruriency test; but if the pro-
jectionist were averaged in with the scientific viewers, the group, includ-
ing 'himself, would probably meet the test. This sacrifice is consistent
with the cross section rule as applied to the entire community. 4 The
.question is whether there is a sufficient difference in the facts where
distribution is to the entire community and where it is to a distinct receiv-
ing group to warrant a change in the average or cross section rule. The
"sacrifice of minority interests in either instance is the same if viewed
relatively. If viewed in absolute terms it would be less where distribution
is to a specific group. Furthermore, if scientists are to view films they
must generally employ laymen to operate the cameras. There are other
situations, no doubt, where scientists are required to use lay assistants.
Therefore, a change from the cross section rule would not seem to be
warranted.
Mixed Motives
Many questions and problems would be raised by 31 Photos and re-
lated decisions if the government should challenge the issue of prurient
effect on the scientific group, or if prurient effect should be proved on
trial, that is, if there are the admittedly mixed motives of pruriency and
valid scientific interest. Different problems arise if the receiving group
is small or is but an individual than arise in a case where the group is quite
large. Other problems are created if the receiving group is a private one
or a private individual, as distinct from a public or quasi-public body.
The type of security that should be required to guarantee that there will
be no breach of trust is not yet clearly defined. What the receiving group
may do with the materials and whether the state could constitutionally
31. Hallmark Productions v. Mosley, 190 F.2d 904 (8th Cir. 1951).
32. Id. at 910.
33. Missouri does not have a statute prohibiting the consumption of obscene ma-
terials by individuals. See Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 563.270, 563.280, 563.290.
34. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957); Volanski v. United States, 246 F.2d
842 (6th Cir. 1947).
432
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prohibit one from creating pornography for his own personal edification
are other unanswered questions.
In spite of the holding that a choice between the "not-obscene"
theory and the "privilege" theory was not necessary, it is conceivable that
in subsequent applications of the statutes it may make a very significant
difference which theory is used. A trier of fact could conceivably find
that printed materials have a prurient effect under the Roth and 31
Photos test on a recipient even though he intended to use them in some
scientific inquiry. If this is the case, the not-obscene theory where the
prurient effect on the receiving group is controlling would seem to be
more restrictive than the privilege theory, since the latter could allow
passage of the materials in the case of mixed motives. The court in
31 Photos, in saying that really these theories are but two sides of the
same coin, and that generally the quantum of the scientific interest in fact
varies inversely with the prurient effect on the scientists involved, is un-
doubtedly correct in a vast majority of cases. But even if a bona fide
scientist cannot be affected by pornography in pictorial form or in litera-
ture where it is relevant to scientific inquiry, it does not necessarily fol-
low that a receiving group importing for the effect of pruriency as well
as for scientific inquiry cannot contribute something in the way of sci-
entific advancement. Whether this is a valid assumption as a matter of
law as it was in 31 Photos is questionable. The real issue where there
are mixed motives should not be merely whether the receiver is a bona
fide scientist or even the prurient effect of the materials on the recipient,
but should be the relative values of the public interest in scientific in-
quiry and the public interest in not having individuals exposed to obscen-
ity. An adoption of the privilege theory would seem to be more realistic
because of its clarification of the issues and its nicer balancing of the
interests.3"
Private Censorship
If the privilege theory is followed, the court is not only suspending
public censorship, but is in fact delegating to a private group administra-
tive authority to censor obscene materials. Even with the holding in 31
Photos that pornography is not obscene per se and that in the hands of the
Institute the materials were not obscene, there is still a form of censor-
ship by a private group, since that group admittedly has control over a
type of "hot" materials, Commonly censorship is the act of screening
certain literature or art, in order to accomplish some purpose of the cen-
sor, to determine whether it shall be available for the perusal of other
35. See Lockhart and McClure, supra note 13, at 368.
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persons,' generally the public. Normally, the harm resulting from an
abuse of censorship is that the public is wrongfully denied access to cer-
tain literary or artistic works. 8 However, this would not be true in the
31 Photos type of censorship because the way would always be open to
determine the obscenity of the materials in another proceeding. 31 Photos
forces this conclusion, since each time a new group is involved there
would have to be a new inquiry to ascertain whether the materials are
obscene as to that particular group." The harm in the 31 Photos situa-
tion may be that certain materials which admittedly ought to be censored,
may become available to the general public. An analagous situation ex-
ists with respect to narcotics and other drugs where the druggist holds
a similar power. An important difference, however, is that obscenity
involves freedom of speech and the press. In this sense, then, there is
private censorship.38
The distinguishing factor where obscenity is privately censored is a
lack of safeguards against abuse of power which ordinarily attend either
public administrative power or most other private administrative power.
For example, legislative committees on oversight and the courts stand
ready to check an abuse of public power, and a continuous licensing sys-
tem controls the handling of liquor, narcotics and other items which
threaten physical well-being. 9
Other safeguards may attend private censorship of obscenity, how-
ever, which do not accompany other public and private administrative
power. A quasi-public institution, as the claimant was in 31 Photos,
36. See note 7 supra.
37. This raises many administrative problems, discussed at pages 435-38 infra.
38. See generally Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARv. L. Rxv. 201
(1937).
39. It may be argued that lack of immediate safeguards is not important, since not
all delegations of administrative power to private groups are attended by a licensing
system. For example, under the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453 (1935),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88, the Section 9 representative is given certain private
economic administrative powers. Steel v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192
(1944). These powers are attended by certain other safeguards, however. See notes
41 and 42 infra and accompanying text. Also, under various state statutes, bar and other
associations have been given a like power to police their memberships by inclusion, ex-
clusion and expulsion. Jaffee, supra note 38, at 229, 249. A distinction may be drawn,
however, in that these instances involve a delegation of economic power related to the
public welfare, which should be contrasted with private power governing narcotics,
liquor and obscenity which relate to the public health, morals and safety. Medical as-
sociations are given power without licensing which involves the public health directly,
but the reason may be that a proper determination of an individual's fitness to practice
medicine is a highly technical matter which the profession itself is deemed most able to
handle. Thus, an absence of licensing may be rationalized on the theory that because
of its technical nature, a licensing body would not be competent to oversee private power
in this situation. This analysis would indicate that there should be a licensing system
to oversee the private censorship of obscenity.
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would be subject to the disciplinary action of its governing body or
agency.4 However, if the group is a voluntary association of scientists
or if the receiving "group" consists of but one scientist, admittedly bona
fide, but not associated with any public institution (perhaps he is inde-
pendently wealthy or makes his living writing books), this substitute
sanction is nonexistent.
In addition, to the extent that private administrative action is sanc-
tioned by the state, even where there are no licensing provisions, there
may be other safeguards in the form of constitutional guarantees against
arbitrary abuse of power. 1 Also, the several state obscenity laws would
be safeguards under which any group or individual, private or public,
could be prosecuted for disseminating obscene materials."
If there is neither a licensing system nor constitutional guarantees
in the form of private civil actions, and if the receiving group is not a
quasi-public institution, external control over the use of the materials
is reduced merely to state obscenity laws. Since the private group can
set its own qualifications for membership, the danger is increased that
certain individuals within the group will be exposed to obscene materials
contrary to the policy of the particular jurisdiction involved. The danger
is also increased that the group will betray its trust by innocently, negli-
gently, or wilfully exposing the materials entrusted to it to persons with-
out the group.
Problems in Administration
Administration of the 31 Photos test introduces a series of practical
problems. A question yet to be answered is whether, after certain ma-
terials have been adjudged obscene under the Roth and 31 Photos test, a
40. Although the Institute is a separate, non-profit corporation, it is closely con-
nected with the University in many respects. Most of the members of the Institute also
teach classes for the University; they are paid through the University and occupy
University facilities. In addition, the Institute is closely identified with the University
in the mind of the public. Interview with Ritchie G. Davis, former attorney for the
Institute, in Bloomington on Nov. 12, 1958. See also the affidavits of President H. B
Wells of Indiana University and Dr. Paul Gebhard, Executive Director of the Institute,
submitted in support of claimant's motion for summary judgment in 31 Photos.
41. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
42. But the effect is to substitute the control of the states for that of the original
censoring authority as expressed in the federal obscenity laws. As a practical matter,
the control may not be nearly as effective as the original one, since the zeal with which
state proceedings will be prosecuted will vary greatly. Therefore, even if the standards
of the substituted control are the same as the original one, the practical effect of the
substitution may be to bring the materials out from under a sure thing-obscenity de-
termined by the original authority-to something less than a sure thing-a possible deter-
mination of obscenity by the substituted authority. Thus, in general, it would appear that
the effect of private censorship would be to expose the public to a greater danger from
the evil of obscenity than if public censorship were employed.
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new determination on the issue of obscenity may be secured merely by
changing the receiving group slightly.43 It seems that in a borderline
case this process could be continued indefinitely until the defendant ob-
tains the desired adjudication. The problem would be greatest where
there is a private receiving group, rather than a quasi-public one, since
the latter would tend to be more stable.
Assume that a publisher tries to mail literature which would clearly
be obscene if disseminated indiscriminately to the general public. If the
defense is made that the materials are being disseminated to a selected,
highly sophisticated group of readers or customers on whom the ma-
terials will not have a prurient effect, 31 Photos tells us that the materials
are riot obscene. As a practical matter the test now becomes almost un-
manageable. The court no longer has a single person to whom the test
is very easily applied, as in the archeologist case, or even a small group of
persons comprising a recognized institution of some kind, as in 31 Photos.
If the burden of proof is on the state or government, it would seem an
almost impossible task to ascertain the average of the group from the
sum of all the characteristics of the individuals, but theoretically this
would have to be done. Even if the group is relatively homogeneous
with respect to educational background, occupation, or degree of intel-
ligence the problem is not solved.
Recent cases which illustrate this problem involved nudist's maga-
zines. If direct proof is required to prove prurient effect, it would be
difficult to establish that all of the addressees in the group are not nudists.
Even if it could be established that the addressees are all nudists, it does
not necessarily follow that the magazine will not be obscene as to them,
especially if it is somewhat risqu6 in content. However, in light of the
frequent holding that nudity is not obscene per se,4" it would seem that
any sincere pictorial or literary work of an educational nature advocating
a certain type of sociological conduct, e.g. nudism, would be protected by
the 31 Photos rule if there were a selective mailing list."
43. A similar administrative problem previously had led to a rule of expediency.
When full length novels were challenged and it became impracticable for the jury to
read the entire work, the rule was adopted that it was only necessary to examine se-
lected passages from the book. Alpert, stpra note 1, at 71. The Ulysses case over-
turned this rule, seemingly in spite of the impracticalities.
44. Parmalee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729, 732-36 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
45. Thus Summerfield v. Sunshine Books, 249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd
mere. 355 U.S. 372 (1958), decided the mailability of a nudist's magazine under the postal
regulations. The holding in the Court of Appeals was that the magazines were obscene
and therefore non-mailable. The facts that the textual material in the magazines was
not obscene, that only certain of the pictures were charged to be so, and further that
there may have been a valid educational or sociological interest involved did not impress
the court. The test used by the trial court was the average reader test combined with
the average person Roth test. The Court of Appeals, consistent with 3Z Photos, noted
NOTES
This administrative problem is created only if there must be direct
proof of prurient effect in the form of examination of the group itself.
One solution may be to allow indirect proof as to the characteristics of
the group in the form of opinion testimony based on a random sample.46
Shifting the burden of proof to the defendant would not solve the prob-
lem, since the task of proving the characteristics of the group would be
equally onerous as to him. If the court allows indirect proof in the form
of opinion testimony, the issue would then be one of credibility. It is
conceivable that because of the impracticalities of direct proof the court
would allow opinion testimony in lieu thereof."
Perhaps another answer to the problem is a method employed by the
Consumers Union of United States which had mailed a report on contra-
ceptives only to those persons who signed a statement that "I am mar-
ried, and use prophylactics on the advice of a physician."4  In order to
make this means more effective, the courts could require that the state-
ment be made under oath, though to do so would add an encumberance
that the trial court had found the mailing list not limited to members of a nudist's colony,
and that these magazines were readily available to the public on newsstands. Id. at 115.
The negative implication then would be that a selective mailing list would be significant.
The Supreme Court reversed without opinion on the basis of Roth, but it is almost cer-
tain that the fault in the Court of Appeals was either their failure to consider the maga-
zine as a whole or their approval of the practice of denying the use of the mails to ma-
terials not yet adjudged obscene in the statutory criminal proceeding. This administra-
tive determination of obscenity was simply not provided for by the statute, and therefore
was unlawful as a prior restraint. The fault in the Court of Appeals was not that they
applied the incorrect law as to the significance of the receiving group; therefore, the
court's dictum on that point is presumedly still of some value.
46. Similar problems arise in unfair competition and trade mark cases. In Ameri-
can Luggage Works v. United States Trunk Co., 158 F. Supp. 50 (D. Mass. 1957), an
unfair competition case, the issue was whether plaintiff's product design had acquired a
secondary meaning with the public. Judge Wyzanski, holding the results of plaintiff's
poll of the market inadmissable, indicated, however, that a properly administered and
statistically valid poll would have been admissable. The court suggested the best way
to administer polls or surveys would be to have the parties submit plans in a pretrial
conference, agree on one, and obtain approval of the court for that plan. In this man-
ner the difficulties of proof would be overcome and there would be no wasted expense
and effort in taking an invalid poll. Similarly, a trade marke case, Marcalus Manufac-
turing Co. v. Watson, 156 F. Supp. 161 (D.D.C. 1957), held the results of a poll in-
admissable to prove whether the public associated plaintiff's maroon oval with its
products. However, the negative implication from the opinion was that a valid poll or
survey would be admissable.
The use of polls, surveys and samples as evidence is a relatively new development
in the law of evidence. See generally Note, 66 HIv. L. REv. 498 (1953).
There may be a distinction between a poll, which was involved in the unfair com-
petition and trademark cases, and a sample which would be involved in the examination
of a receiving group in an obscenity case, since the former may be objectionable because
of the hearsay evidence rule while the latter is not. Thus there would seem to be a
stronger case for admissability of evidence based on a valid sample than that gathered
from a public opinion poll. There will be no distinction, however, if the applicability of
the hearsay rule is successfully challenged. Id. at 504.
47. See note 43 supra.
48. Consumers Union of United States v. Walker, 145 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
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which would detract from its usefulness. Nevertheless, requiring a state-
ment under oath would seem to be both reasonable and desirable especially
since there is no apparent sanction for merely signing a false statement.
If the issue of obscenity is tried by a jury, one observes the interest-
ing phenomenon of a jury, theoretically composed of the average person,
having the task of ascertaining the mores or characteristics of an allegedly
more highly sophisticated group." It seems doubtful whether an average
jury could determine, sense, or appreciate the effect of materials chal-
lenged as obscene on a group allegedly more sophisticated. However, this
problem becomes less important if the opinion method of proof is used,
the issue then being largely one of credibility as between expert
testimony.5"
Personal Edification
Suppose a bona fide art collector has decorated his home with decor
which to the average person would be obscene. Lawful possession may
have been obtained either because he created the material himself or be-
cause the mores of the community had changed during his possession.
This problem may be labeled personal edification, which involves the
issues of whether one can be constitutionally deprived of the right to
create what to the community as a whole would be obscene; whether one
can privately view materials which are obscene; and whether one can
display them in his home for the benefit of family and guests, or must
allow some to view and some not. Affidavits by the possessor that he
will maintain security measures such as those used by the Institute in
31 Photos might have some effect on the outcome."
49. This problem, although real, is not novel. It is encountered in any negligence
case where the duty of the jury is to establish the standard of care for conduct other
than that which the average man will usually experience. For example, the standard
of care for driving a car theoretically can be validly ascertained because most jurors
will have driven cars, but the standard of care a physician should exercise can be ascer-
tained only through the use of expert witnesses, and therefore will generally present only
an issue of credibility except in extreme cases obvious even to non-professionals. See
Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414, 418-19 (1952).
50. The role that expert testimony should play should be determined by an empiri-
cal study as to the competence of the jury to determine prurient effect. If it can be sci-
entifically shown that the jury is incompetent to handle this, and that only an expert
physiologist, psychologist or sociologist can ascertain the effect, then the issue should be
taken from the jury in much the same manner that the issue of a plaintiff's physical in-juries in tort cases has necessarily been taken from the jury. One problem to be con-
sidered, although of diminishing importance, would be the rule of evidence that an ex-
pert witness may not testify as to an issue of ultimate fact. 7 WIGMORi, EVIDENCE §§
1920-21 (3rd ed. 1940) ; Ladd, supra note 49, at 423-24.
51. These security measures are listed in the affidavit, filed in the 31 Photos case,
of Dr. Paul H. Gebhard, Executive Director of the Institute, thusly:
To go beyond this antechamber one must pass through a door which is kept
locked at all times, or go through the secretary's office and into the Executive
NOTES
An exchange of pornography between a "professi6nal and an ama-
teur photographer was found not to be within the federal statute prb-'
hibiting the delivery of obscene materials in interstate commerce by an
express company. 2 Since it found the exchanges "were for the personal
and private edification of the parties," the court did not discuss or try
to ascertain the prurient effect on the receiver. This would indicate that
under existing statutes there is not sufficient harm in personal edifica-
tion to be unlawful; the harm must be multiplied before it falls within
the obscenity statutes. 3 The court failed to mention the possibility that
these materials might not be maintained under strict security measures.
In comparison, the archeologist case, in which a different result was
reached under the Tariff Act, denied an individual access to obscene
materials. The only distinguishing factor between the cases apparently
was that different statutes were involved. . This would not appear to be
a significant difference, especially since the court in the case involving the
photographers failed to cite any authority either in precedent or in logic
for its position that personal edification somehow implies a privilege.
The federal statutes are not concerned with the consumption or creation
of obscene materials, except insofar as the federal government has ple-
nary powers over interstate commerce and the mails. A disability on the
part of the federal government to prohibit the creation or consumption
of obscene materials should not be transformed into an exception to the
statutory prohibition against mailing them, as seems to have been done.
The constitutional issue as to whether the states could prohibit the
Director's office which, in turn, communicates with the other offices and
rooms....
Within the library the erotic books and manuscripts have been segregated
in locked cabinets for which only Gebhard, Martin, Pomeroy, and the librarian,
Mrs. Hare, have keys .... Erotic art, photographs, and objects are kept in
locked cabinets in the Executive Director's office ....
The affidavit also discloses that the entire building is locked after 11:00 p. in., except
for one door with an attendant; that the janitor service is in trusted hands; that campus
police patrol the building at night; and that there have been no successful break-ins
during the history of the Institute. The affidavit concludes by stating that the library
and collections are for the sole use of Institute members or specially authorized scholars
who may examine only relevant materials in "bona fide scholarly research."
52. United States v. Helback, 76 F. Supp. 985 (D. Ore. 1948).
53. Writers on the subject of obscenity do not agree that there is scientific proof
for the assertion of the legislatures that a reading or viewing of obscene materials leads
to a substantial harm to the community. Therefore, since there is substantial sociological
support for either assertion, the courts are correct in allowing the legislative finding of
harm presumptive validity. Compare KINSEY, POMEROY, GEBHARD AND MARTIN, SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR OF THE HUMAN FEMALE, (1953) 653, 662, 670-71; and SExUAL BEHAVIOR OF
THE HUMAN MALE (1948) 363, 510; Alpert, supra note 1, at 73-74; Lockhart and Mc-
Clure, supra note 13, at 332-33; and Paul and Schwartz, supra note 7, at 229-30 (all
generally to the effect that no harm can be shown), with S. Rep. No. 2381, 84th Cong.,
2d Ses. (1956) 62; and Schmidt, A Justification of Statutes Barring Obscenity from the
Mail, 26 FOreDHAM L. REv. 70 (1947) (supporting harmful effect).
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consumption of obscenity has not been reached. Since the states can pro-
hibit the dissemination of obscenity among the public as a whole, it would
seem that they could also prohibit the consumption of it by an individual,
seeing that this is the ultimate evil at which obscenity statutes are aimed."
The problem is analogous to prohibiting the consumption of alcohol,
which has always been considered to be within the police power of the
states.
The reason that personal edification generally has not been pro-
hibited by statute stems from the practical difficulties of enforcement.
The seller or publisher is especially vulnerable to discovery and effective
enforcement; consequently, most statutes have been directed at this link
in the chain of traffic in obscene materials. Analogy may again be drawn
to prohibition of the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages. The
experience was that the major producers, sellers, and. distributors of
liquor were relatively easy to shut down, whereas the individual producer-
consumers (moonshiners) were difficult to seek out and arrest. The
same would very likely hold true with the consumption of obscenity.
CONCLUSION
The character of the receiving group has recently been emphasized
as an element in determining obscenity. Consequently, the concept of
obscenity per se has been clarified and severely limited. By confining
the test of prurient effect to the receiving group, it is possible to allow
scientific organizations to pursue research under existing obscenity
statutes. But other groups may then seek possession of prurient ma-
terials on the ground that the latter are not prurient as to them. This
creates many administrative and legal problems which will have to be
resolved as they arise. The courts, by adopting a scientific privilege,
could avoid many problems and reduce the danger that less responsible
non-scientific groups will gain access to such materials. A scientific
privilege theory, because it creates an exception in favor of scientists
only, would also reduce dangers from private administrative power and
allow a balancing of interests where the motives of the receiving group
are mixed. A disadvantage would be that certain non-scientific groups
would be deprived of materials prurient to the community as a whole, but
not as to that group. The necessity for creating and using either a privi-
lege theory or a non-obscene theory could be obliterated by stating more
clearly in statutes the evil sought to be prevented. Thus the Tariff Act,
54. Statutes may single out certain groups and prohibit distribution of materials
having a prurient effect as to them. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) ; Volan-
ski v. United States, 246 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1947).
NOTES
rather than prohibiting the importation of materials denoted merely as
obscene, might be aimed at materials whose effect would be to cause lust-
ful thoughts or any specifically enumerated overt sexual conduct, such
as masturbation or the various sex crimes.
JENCKS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS: CONSCIENTI-
OUS OBJECTORS AND GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
In one of its more controversial decisions, the Supreme Court in
Jencks v. United States' held that in criminal prosecutions the Govern-
ment must release to the defense, upon request, pre-trial statements made
by government witnesses which "were of the events and activity related
in their testimony."2  Not only was the previous rule requiring the de-
fendant to lay a preliminary ground of inconsistency between the con-
tents of the report and the testimony before being entitled to inspect such
reports held to be in error,' but the accepted practice of the trial judge
examining the reports in camera, to determine their relevancy and ma-
teriality before turning them over to the defendant also was specifically
disapproved." Perhaps the chief reason for public dissension with re-
spect to this decision can be attributed to the dissent of Mr. Justice Clark
in which he warned: "Unless the Congress changes the rule announced
by the Court today, those intelligence agencies of our Government en-
gaged in law enforcement may as well close up shop for the Court has
opened their files to the criminal and thus offered him a Roman holiday
for rumaging through confidential information as well as vital national
secrets."'  The implication from this emotional language was two-fold.
1. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
2. Id. at 668.
3. Id. at 666. The Fifth Circuit, in deciding the Jencks case, 226 F.2d 540 (1955),
used this theory as the basis for denying the FBI report to Jencks. It based its holding
on Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 (1953). The Supreme Court, however, held
that the reliance on Gordon was misplaced and that the proper interpretation of Gordon
was that "for production purposes, it need only appear that the evidence is relevant,
competent and outside any exclusionary rule." Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657,
667 (1957), quoting Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 420 (1953).
4. Jencks v. United States, supra note 3, at 669. For authority contra, see 8
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 117-18 (3d ed. 1940). For cases which had specifically held
that an in camera inspection by the court was proper, see, e.g., United States v. Grayson,
166 F2d 863 (2d Cir. 1948) ; United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946) ;
United States v. Cohen, 145 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944) ; United States v. Krulewitch, 145
F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v. Mesarosh, 116 F. Supp. 345 (D.D.C. 1953),
rev'd on othcr grounds, 352 U.S. 1 (1956).
5. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 681-82 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
